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Recognition Of Foreign Divorces
The number of divorces has increased many fold since the time
of Henry VIII. No doubt Henry would be envious of the facility with
which a divorce can be obtained now, but "the other side of the
fence" in the United States is only a light green. All forty eight states
permit divorce, and the grounds vary from adultery only to mental
cruelty; the residence requirements vary from six weeks to two years.
Today, with our great transient population, this situation gives rise
to many conflict of law problems. Also, it is only natural for persons,
who are financially able, to go from one State to another to take ad-
vantage of less stringent divorce laws. The problem is: What recogni-
tion must a State give these migratory divorces?
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The answer to this problem at the present time apppears to lie in
the construction given the full faith and credit clause of the federal
constitution1 by the United State Supreme Court. In the early case of
Mills v. Duryea,2 the court declared a foreign judgment record duly
authenticated as provided by the Act of 1790 was conclusive evidence
in an action on the foreign judgment in a sister State and was not sub-
ject to collateral attack.3 Sixty years later the court in Thompson v.
Whitman4 qualified the board language of Mills v. Duryea, supra, and
stated that "the jurisdiction of the court by which a judgment is
rendered in any State may be questioned in a collateral proceeding in
another State notwithstanding the fourth article of the Constitution
and the law of 1790, and notwithstanding the averments contained in
1 U. S. CONsr. ART. IV, §1 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
The Act of May 26, 1790, 1 STAT. 122 (1790), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§1738, 1739
(Supp. 1950), provided that "Such . .. judicial proceedings, or copies thereof, .. .
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
2 7 Cranch 481 (U.S. 1813).
3 The difference between a direct attack and a collateral attack upon a judg-
ment is that the former is an attempt to have a judgment or decree declared void in
a proceeding instituted for that specific purpose whereas the latter is an attempt
to impeach the validity or binding effect of the decree as a side issue in a proceeding
instituted primarily for some other purpose. FRMrAN, LAw OF JUDGMENTS §306
(5th ed. 1925).
4 85 U.S. 457 (1873).
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the record itself."5 Today, the Constitutional mandate and the Act of
1790, as amended, require "the record of every judgment... duly
authenticated and offered in evidence in another state (be accorded)
the same faith and credit to which it was entitled in the state whence
it was taken ' 6 except when it is proved the foreign court had no
jurisdiction of the person or of the subject matter.7
In the recognition of foreign divorces, this means the forum can-
not redetermine the substantive grounds of a foreign divorce no mat-
ter how erroneous they are, but only may re-examine the jurisdiction-
al facts supporting the decree. This leaves one question: What are the
jurisdictional fact (s) of divorce? In the historic Williams cases8
the Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional basis for a foreign
ex parte divorce is domicile, and where there is a bona fide domicile
the divorce must be given full faith and credit; but, if there is no
bona fide domicile the decree is void and need not be recognized. 9
However, full faith and credit does not stop a State from recogniz-
ing a foreign divorce under the principles of comity if procedural
due process is satisfied in the State which rendered the decree.10
With this in mind, I would like to examine some of the situations
that have arisen and may arise in the future in relation to this prob-
lem.
3 Ibid at 469. "It is only when the jurisdiction of the court in another state
is not impeached, either as to subject matter or the person, that the record of the
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit." 1 KENT'S CoMmENTAEmI 281. The
jurisdiction of a foreign court may be assailed by parol evidence which is in
absolute contradiction to recitals of jurisdiction in the record. FREEmAN, LAw oF
JUDGMENTs 166 (5th ed. 1925).
6 Farams, LAw oF JUDGMrNTS § 1566 (5th ed. 1925).
T Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1875).
8 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945). Also see, Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
Prior to the Williams cases a foreign divorce was only accorded full faith and
credit when both parties appeared in the action, or when the decree was granted in
a State, which at the time it was granted, was the domicile of both spouses, or when
the decree was granted at the matrimonial domicile. A foreign ex parte decree
granted at the domicile of one of the spouses was not entitled to full faith and
credit unless that State was also the matrimonial domicile. Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U.S. 867 (1905).
For an excellent discussion see, Stumberg, Jurisdiction to Divorce, 24 Tx. L.
Rav. 119 (1946).
9 In the Williams cases, the Court said divorce is neither an action in personam
or in rem, but did admit that divorce had elements peculiarly in rem in nature. It is
commonly declared that divorce is an action to change a status, and since this status
is so intimately interrelated with the public welfare some real connection is required
with the State which grants the divorce in order to protect the public interest. This
connection is domicile.
10 Herron v. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 110 So. 595 (1926) ; Miller v. Miller, 200
Iowa 1195, 206 N.W. 265 (1925). Since the Williams cases the recognition of foreign
divorces under the principles of comity has appreciably lessened.
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FOREIGN ex parte DivoRcES
When Mr. Jones goes to Nevada and procures an ex parte di-
vorce must Ohio recognize it? In the Williams cases, supra, the Sup-
reme Court held these divorces were entitled to full faith and credit
if the plaintiff was a bona fide domiciliary of the state which grant-
ed the divorce.1 '
Fear has been expressed that if domicile is the controlling factor
there is nothing to stop Nevada and a few other States which grant
"across the counter" divorces from reducing this period to a month or
a week or even a day. At the present time there is no case in point on
these facts, but the court in the first Williams case12 went to great
pains to express that their decision did not impose Nevada law upon
North Carolina nor did it impose North Carolina law upon Nevada,
and from this it would seem, in balancing the conflicting interests of
two states, the Court would set a minimum residence period and call
any shorter period a denial of procedural due process to the absent
spouse.13 In support of this conclusion, is the fact that in several re-
cent decisions the Supreme Court, in upholding foreign contested di-
vorces, has pointed out that procedural due process was not violated.14
FOREIGN CoNTEnSTD DivocEs
The degree of recognition that must be given a foreign divorce
when the defendant personally appears in the proceeding has been
determined in three recent Supreme Court decisions.15 The Court ex-
11 Williams v. North Carolina, 325 US. 226 (1945). This is a question of fact
to be determined according to reasonable rules of evidence promulgated by the
laws of the forum.
22 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942).
13 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US. 714 (1877).
'4 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 US. 348 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 US. 384 (1948); Estin
v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
15 Davis v. Davis, 305 US. 32 (1938). Mrs. Davis, in an action in the District of
Columbia, challenged the validity of a prior Virginia divorce decree. Mrs. Davis had
appeared in the Virginia action and contested the jurisdictional issue which was
decided against her. The lower court found that the Virginia court had no juris-
diction but was reversed by the Supreme Court which said the determination of this
issue by the Virginia court was res adjudicata.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). Mrs. Sherrer instituted a divorce action
in Florida. Mr. Sherrer retained Florida counsel, and, in his answer, denied Mrs.
Sherrer's allegation of a bona fide Florida residence; however, a settlement was agreed
upon, and at the hearing the issue of domicile was not raised. In a later proceeding
in Massachusetts, the Supreme Court declared the jurisdictional issue in the Florida
action was res adjudicata since the parties had full opportunity to litigate it.
Coe v. Coe, 334 US. 378 (1948). This case is similar to Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra,
except the defendant's answer admitted the bona fides of the plaintiff's Nevada
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pressed itself thus: " ... the requirements of full faith and credit bar
a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdic-
tional grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been
participation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where
the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the juris-
dictional issues (regardless if he avails himself of the opportunity or
not), and where the decree is not susceptible to such collateral attack
in the courts of the state which rendered the decree."' 6
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DIVORCES IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS
The Williams cases, supra, declared what recognition North Caro-
lina had to give a Nevada divorce in a bigamy prosecution.l T As pre-
viously stated, this is determined by the bona fides of the accused's
domicile in the divorce state.
One question remains open here. Would the results of the
Williams cases be changed if the foreign divorce was contested instead
of ex parte? Under the elementary principles of res adjudicata a per-
son is not estopped from collaterally attacking a judgment to which
he was neither a party nor a privy. There is no reason why the imme-
diate point at hand is not covered by the general rule,' 8 as a state is
not a party to a foreign divorce action either contested or ex parte.
DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
In Estin v. Estin,19 the Supreme Court recognized the divisible
divorce. The underlying premise of this concept is that the institu-
tion of marriage is not a unitary status but is a complex of legal rela-
tions some of which may be terminated by ex parte divorces and
domicile. The Nevada decree was held to be res adjudicata in a subsequent
Massachusetts proceeding as defendant had full opportunity to litigate the juris-
dictional issue.
16 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351 (1948).
17 Mr. Williams and Mrs. Hendrix left their respective spouses in North
Carolina and went to Nevada where they procured ex parte divorces. They were
married in Nevada and returned to North Carolina where they were indicted and
convicted of bigamy.
18 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 79 and §83.
§ 79. "A person who at the time of rendition of a valid judgment is a party to
the action is bound by and entitled to the benefits of the rules of res adjudicata .. "
§ 83. "A person who is not a party but who is in privity with the parties in an
action terminating in a valid judgment is ... bound by and entitled to the benefits
of the rules of res adjurdicata."
19 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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some of which may not.20
In 1943, Mrs. Estin was awarded a support and maintenance de-
cree in a New York proceeding in which Mr. Estin personally appear-
ed. Two years later he procured a Nevada ex parte divorce and soon
thereafter ceased making payments under the support and mainten-
ance decree. In an action for arrearages, the lower New York courts,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, held for Mrs. Estin, although they
admitted Mr. Estin had acquired a bona fide Nevada domicile.21 The
Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Douglas, said: The result in this
decision is to make the divorce divisible-to give effect to the Nevada
decree in so far as it affects marital status and to make it ineffective
on the issue of alimony.22
The Court proceeded on two distinct grounds. The first was that
the judgment as handed down accommodated the "legitimate inter-
ests" of both New York and Nevada in that "New York was rightly
concerned lest the abandoned spouse be impoverished and become a
public charge," and that Nevada was primarily concerned with the
marital status of its domiciliaries with regard to their capacity to re-
marry. The second ground was that the New York decree for alimony
alone was an intangible property right, and under cardinal principles
of due process could not be taken from Mrs. Estin unless the court had
in personam jurisdiction over her.2 3
Mr. Jusctice Jackson and Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on
the ground that the New York decision denied full faith and credit to
the Nevada divorce. Mr. Justice Jackson said: "As I understand New
York law, if, after a decree for separation and alimony, the husband
had obtained a New York divorce against his wife, it would terminate
her right to alimony. If the Nevada judgment is to have full faith
and credit, I think it must have the same effect a similar New York
decree would have." 24 The majority of the Court summarily disposed
of this point by saying that the highest court of New York had held
in this case that under New York law a support order survived subse-
quent divorce, and this conclusion was binding on the Court "except
as it conflicts with the Full Faith and Credit clause." 25
Actually, the approach of the dissenters appears to be a reverse
application of the full faith and credit clause, for, in the ordinary
situation, a court is required to give the judgments of sister States the
same faith and credit they receive in the jurisdiction in which they
20 Bingham, The American Law Institute vs. The Supreme Court In the Matter
of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CORNE.LL L.Q. 393, 416 (1936). Cook, Is Haddock v.
Haddock Overruled, 18 IND. L.J. 165, 172 (1943).
21 Estin v. Estin, 296, N.Y. 308, 73 N.E. 2d 113 (1947).
22 334 US. 541, 549 (1948).
23 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US. 714 (1877).
24 334 U.S. 541, 544 (1948).
25 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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were rendered. But, here, it is being asked that a foreign judgment be
given the same faith and credit as a similar domestic judgment would
receive in the forum. It has been suggested that the dissenters did not
mean the full faith and credit clause but actually had in mind
either the equal protection or the privileges and immunities clause.26
However, by way of conjecture, it seems the justices would not make
a basic error, but actually had in mind an increase in the scope of the
full faith and credit clause.
Assuming New York law, like that of Pennsylvania, affirmatively
declared that divorce terminated prior support decrees, could New
York discriminate against foreign ex parte divorces by saying the
law terminating prior judgments for support was only applicable to
domestic divorces? Would New York be allowed to give greater faith
and credit to domestic divorces than to foreign divorces? The dissen-
ters in the Estin case supra, felt this was the situation the court was
faced with and found a denial of full faith and credit. Conceivably,
the majority opinion could be squared with this view by saying the
majority felt the New York cases on this point were inconclusive, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals was not discriminatory towards
the Nevada decree but was merely a determination of the existing New
York law. This thought is fortified by Mr. Justice Douglas' state-
ment in the majority opinion to the effect that the opinion of the
Court of Appeals was binding on the Supreme Court "except as it
conflicts with the Full Faith and Credit Clause.27 This statement,
taken together with the dissenting opinion, appears to leave an open-
ing for the Court to adopt the reverse application of full faith and
credit. If this should be the case there is no doubt that New York
would be prohibited from denying a federal right by giving greater
faith and credit to domestic judgments than to valid foreign judg-
ments. If New York is, in effect, discriminating in this manner a case
should be forthcoming soon.
It should be mentioned that support and maintenance is not the
only aspect of divisible divorce. Other interests which could well be
handled in the same manner are legitimacy of children, property in-
26 "In the Estin v. Estin situation, the full faith and credit clause and the act
of Congress made thereunder would appear to require New York to give Nevada
divorce decrees 'the same faith and credit... as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such state from which they are taken,' i.e. the same faith and credit as they
have in Nevada. The full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress would not
appear to require New York to give Nevada divorces the same effect as New York
divorces. Accordingly, although Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson
specifically refer to the full faith and credit clause it has been conjectured that it
was the privileges and immunities clause or the equal protection clause which they
really had in mind." J.H.C. Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Hnv. L. REv. 1287, 1299
(1951).
27 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544 (1948). (Emphasis added).
[Vol. 13
COMMENTS
terests of the spouses and amenability to criminal prosecution.
ALIMONy 23
There are two broad problems in this area: (1) What recognition
must be given foreign alimony decrees and judgments in which both
spouses participated; and, (2) does the procurement of a foreign ex
parte or contested divorce estop either spouse in a subsequent action
for alimony alone?
(1) Recognition of Foreign Decrees.
The decree of recognition a State must accord a foreign alimony
decree is also determined by the interpretation given the full faith and
credit clause. As a general rule, the test is whether the foreign decree is
final or is subject to modification and recall in the State in which it was
granted. If it is final it falls within the protection of the full faith and
credit clause; if it is not final it does not receive this protection for to
do so would give the decree greater faith and credit than it is entitled
to in the State in which it was rendered.
Generally, there are two types of alimony judgments; those calling
for a lump sum payment, and those calling for installment payments.
At an early date the Supreme Court declared that accrued installments
not subject to modification were entitled to full faith and credit even
though they had not been reduced to judgment in the state which
granted the alimony decree.29
As has already been stated, a decree for installments subject to
retroactive modification after the accrual of the installments is denied
recognition in the vast majority of States on the basis that it lacks the
requisite finality. 0 Ohio adheres to the majority view.3 1 In one case,
however, it was declared that full faith and credit demands that
alimony decrees subject to retroactive modification be recognized as
to accrued installments until they are modified.32 It is interesting to
note the Supreme Court has held that a court may, without violating
2s Alimony is an action in personam, and before any award may be granted the
spouse sought to be charged therewith must be personally before the court.
29 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (U.S. 1858).
30 Scudder v. Scudder, 11 Alaska 303 (1949); Cohen v. Cohen, 158 Fla. 307, 30
So. 2d 307 (1948); Webster v. Webster, 177 La. 306, 148 So. 241 (1933); Wilson v.
Wilson, 143 Me. 113,56 A. 2d 453 (1948); Skinner v. Skinner, 205 Mich. 243, 171 N.W.
383 (1919); Johnson v. Johnson, 196 Misc. 487, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Hewett v. Hewett, 44 R.I., 308, 116 A. 883 (1922); Rumpf v. Rumpf, 257 S.W. 669
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
31 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 117 Ohio St. 558, 160 N.E. 34 (1927) ; Gilbert v.
Gilbert, 83 Ohio St. 265, 94 N.E. 421 (1911).
32 Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 (1922).
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full faith and credit, modify a foreign divorce decree which is subject
to modification in the state in which it was granted.3 3 Some States
hold that although this situation is not within the coverage of the full
faith and credit clause recognition will be given on the principles of
comity.3 4 California and a few other Western States have extended
comity recognition to include the enforcement of prospective payments
under foreign decrees.3 5
In spite of the great number of State opinions to the contrary,
there is a valid argument that full faith and credit must be given to
accrued alimony subject to retroactive modification. This exact point
has never been determined by the Supreme Court, and all the State
opinions are based on the interpretation of the early case of Sistare v.
Sistare.3 6 In Barber v. Barber,3 7 the court took the broad position that
a decree for alimony was entitled to full faith and credit "until the
decree has been recalled, as any other judgment for money is."38
Forty years later the court retracted some what in Lynde v. Lynde,3 9
a most brief opinion which made no mention of the Barber case. Mrs.
Lynde, in a New Jersey proceeding, was awarded a lump sum of
$8,840 and $80 a week for future alimony. She brought suit on this
decree in New York where judgment was awarded for the fixed sum
but not for the accrued installments. The Supreme Court, in affirming
the New York decision, said: "The decree for the payment of the
$8,840 was a fixed sum already due, and the judgment of the court
below was properly restricted to that. The provision of the payment
for alimony in the future was subject to the discretion of the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey, which might at any time alter it and was not
a final judgment for a fixed sum." 40 Nine years later in Sistare v. Sistare,
supra, it was contended that the Barber case had been partially over-
ruled by the Lynde case. The Court attempted to reconcile the two
cases but stated that in any event the Lynde case should be qualified
so as not to overrule the Barber case. The Court then laid down two
broad propositions that were to declare the law: "First - that general-
ly speaking, where a decree is rendered for alimony and is made pay-
able in future installments the right to such installments becomes
38 Holvey v. Holvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
34 Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P. 2d 701 (1941); Espeland v.
Espeland, 111 Mont. 365, 109 P. 2d 792 (1941); Cousineau v. Cousineau, 155 Ore.
184, 63 P. 2d 897 (1936); Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 44 P. 2d 446 (1955).
35 Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P. 2d 701 (1941); Cousineau v.
Cousineau, 155 Ore. 184, 63 P. 2d 897 (1936); Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 44
P. 2d 446 (1935).
36 218 U.S. 1 (1909).
37 21 How. 582 (U.S. 1858).
38 Id. at 595.
39 181 U.S. 183 (1900).
40 Id. at 187.
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absolute and vested on becoming due, and is there protected by the
full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has
been made prior to the maturity of the installments,.... Second, that
this general rule, however, does not obtain where by the law of the
State in which a judgment for future alimony is rendered the right
to demand and receive such future alimony is discretionary with the
court which rendered the decree to such an extent that no absolute or
vested right attached to receive the installments ordered by the decree
to be paid, even though no application to annul or modify the decree
in respect to alimony had been made prior to the installments be-
coming due."41 From this language the State courts conceived the
finality test. In 1944, another Barber42 case reached the Supreme
Court. The Court did not find it necessary to discuss the problem of
what faith and credit must be given accrued installments subject to
retroactive modification but added oil to the flame by saying: " . . .
it is unnecessary to consider whether a decree or judgment for alimony
already accrued, which is subject to modification or recall in the forum
which granted it, but is not yet so modified, is entitled to full faith and
credit until such time as it is modified." 43
From a social viewpoint it is most desirable to demand that this
type of decree be given full faith and credit. Under the "finality" rule
a husband can evade his moral and legal duty of supporting his ex-
spouse by merely moving to another State. The wife, who in the
majority of cases is the destitute party, must either follow her husband
or get the accrued installments reduced to judgment, and before she
can do the latter, notice must be given the husband in order to satisfy
procedural due process.44 The unfairness of this is apparent.
From the legal viewpoint it must be noted the Supreme Court has
never unequivocally adopted the finality test but said in the Sistare
case full faith and credit did not attach when the right to receive such
accrued installments was discretionary "to such an extent" with the
court which granted the decree that no "absolute or vested right"
existed to receive the installments. Further, it should be kept in mind
that the Court in the Sistare case said that Lynde v. Lynde, supra, was
41 218 U.S. 1, 16 (1909).
42 328 US. 77 (1949).
43 Id. at 81.
44 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 US. 220 (1946), reh. denied, 328 U.S. 876 (1946). The
Court in the Griffin case did not say exactly what type of notice would suffice. The
Court said in reference to the action reducing the alimony arrearages to judgment:
" ... we find . . . that due process ... does require further notice of the time
and place of such furiher proceedings . " At another place the Court said the
judgment could not be granted against the absent husband " ... without some
form of notice by personal or substituted service." The dissenting judges, Mr.
Justice Rutledge, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Mr. Justice Black, felt there was no
denial of due process because the Court in rendering the initial alimony decree
procured jurisdiction to later reduce any arrearages to judgment.
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not to overrule the earlier Barber case, and in the second Barber case
the court definitely threw out an invitation for this point to be litigated
and thus showed the issue was far from settled in, the minds of the
Justices. The final answer appears to depend on whether the Court
will or will not characterize accrued installments subject to modifica-
tion "absolute and vested." As a practical matter it seems to deny full
faith and credit to refuse to recognize accrued installments subject to
modification almost as much as it would to refuse to recognize decrees
not subject to modification, because unless extenuating circumstances
exist courts are most hesitant to modify an alimony judgment. It is
suggested that the right to this type of alimony is "absolute and
vested".
When accrued installments subject to modification are rectucea
to final judgment, full and complete recognition must be given the
judgment.45 Furthermore, clear and convincing proof is required be-
fore a court may find such a judgment is subject to modification.4 6
The majority of courts refuse to recognize decrees for prospective
payments, not yet accrued.47 Under the finality test this is sound be-
cause these are almost universally subject to modification in the forum
in which they are rendered. However, as has been pointed out, a few
states allow recognition and enforce them in the same manner as
domestic decrees are enforced.48
Alimony pendite lite is also refused recognition because in
practically all cases it is subject to the discretion of the court which
granted it. 49
Once a foreign judgment for alimony is recognized the majority
of States receive it as evidence in support of a domestic judgment
which is enforced and executed as any other judgment at law.6 ° A few
jurisdictions follow what seems to be a more enlightened approach
and enforce foreign alimony decrees exactly the same as domestic
alimony decrees,5 1 i.e., equitable remedies are available to the plaintiff.
(2) Foreign Decrees and Res Adjudicata
Will parties to a foreign divorce be estopped from later prosecuting
45 Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1949).
46 Ibid.
47 See note 3, supra.
48 See note 7, supra.
49 Geisler v. Geisler, 124 Ky. 292, 98 S.W. 1023 (1907); Kelly v. Kelly, 121 N.J.
Eq. 361, 189 A. 665 (1937); Henry v. Henry, 74 NV. Va. 563, 82 S.E. 522 (1914).
50 Jacobs, The Enforcement of Foreign Decrees for Alimony, 6 Lmiw and CON-
TMPoRARY PROBLEMs 250, 267 (1939), and cases cited.
51 German v. German, 122 Conn. 155, 188 A. 429 (1936); Sackler v. Sackler,
- Fla. - , 47 So. 2d 292 (1951); Summers v. District Court, - Nev. - ,
227 P. 2d 201 (1951). cf Thones v. Thones, 125 Tenn. 184, 203 S.V. 2d 597 (1948).
Also see note 7, supra.
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an action for alimony alone? Where both spouses appear in the
foreign action this is practically a moot question since alimony pro-
visions are usually handed down along with the divorce decree. If the
foreign divorce is ex parte a different problem exists.
When both spouses appear in the foreign action, the general rules
of res adjudicata would seem to preclude a subsequent determination
of alimony in a sister State.52 There is no Supreme Court case in point,
and Estin v. Estin, supra, is the case most analagous. Conceivably it
could be argued that divorce and alimony are two entirely distinct
causes of action, and the failure to ask for alimony in a divorce pro-
ceeding would not bar a subsequent action for it. In the Sheerer5a and
Coe5 4 cases, the Court declared that if the jurisdictional issue had
been litigated, or if a reasonable opportunity to litigate it had been
presented, the parties would be estopped from collaterally re-examin-
ing the issue in another action. Will the Court apply this reasoning to
the issue of alimony? Most courts, under these facts, find an estoppel.55
However, in Ohio, a further distinction appears to have been drawn.
In Gilbert v. Gilbert,56 the following facts were present: Mrs. Gilbert
obtained a judgment for alimony alone in Ohio; later Mr. Gilbert
initiated a divorce action in South Dakota in which Mrs. Gilbert
entered an appearance and received alimony which she had asked
for; she returned to Ohio and sued for arrearages which were due
under the prior Ohio alimony judgment. The Ohio Supreme Court
disallowed Mrs. Gilbert's claim stating that since she had submitted
all her claims and rights to the jurisdiction of the South Dakota court
"she is now estopped and will not be heard to again assert in this
state any rights she may have had under the original decree .... 57
In Manney v. Manney,58 the Court of Appeals of Montgomery County,
distinguished the Gilbert case. The facts were the same as in the
Gilbert case except Mrs. Manney in answering her husband's Nevada
divorce petition did not ask for alimony. Mr. Manney stopped making
payments under a previous Ohio judgment for alimony alone, and the
court of appeals ordered him to pay, stating that Mrs. Manney was not
estopped as she appeared in the Nevada action only to refute the ac-
52 RSTATEMfENT, JUDGMENTS. p. 159 (Introductory material to res adjudicata).
"Where, therefore, the second action is based upon the same cause of action as
that upon which the first action was based, the judgment is conclusive as to all
matters which were litigated or might have been litigated in the first action."
63 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
54 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
55 Norris v. Norris, 200 Minn. 246, 273 N.W. 708 (1937); Lynn v. Lynn, 302
N.Y. 193, 97 N.E. 2d 748 (1951); Schacht v. Schacht, 295 N.Y. 439, 68 N.E. 2d 433
(1946).
56 83 Ohio St. 265, 94 N.E. 421 (1911).
57 Id. at 271.
s - Ohio App. -, 59 N.E. 2d 7.55 (1944). Accord. Metzger v. Metzger,
32 Ohio App. 202, 167 N.E. 690 (1929).
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cusations her husband had made in his petition and not to litigate the
issue of alimony. Further, it made no difference that Mrs. Manney
had reasonable opportunity to litigate the issue of alimony. It should
be noted that the court held this way in spite of the fact that Mrs.
Manney in the prayer of her answer asked for such other relief as "may
be meet and equitable." From an interpretation of these cases, the
Ohio law appears to estop a wife's claim for alimony alone, past or
future, where she either (1) instituted the foreign divorce action; or,
(2) filed a cross petition; or (3) asked for alimony in her answer.
In the majority of states, a wife is not barred from a subsequent
action for alimony when her husband obtained a foreign ex parte
divorce.5 9 The concept of divisible divorce, as set forth in Estin v.
Fstin, supra, supports this approach to a great extent.
The few cases in point are about evenly divided as to whether a
wife who receives a foreign ex parte divorce may later sue for alimony
alone.6 0
DivoRcFs OBTAINED IN FOREIGN NATIONS
The full faith and credit clause does not apply to judgments or
decrees granted in foreign nations, and any recognition accorded them
is based upon the principles of comity.61
As a general rule foreign judgments and decrees of divorce are
recognized; 2 however, if the procedure or substantive divorce law of
the nation is repugnant to the public policy of the forum recognition
is denied.6 This general rule obtains regardless of whether the foreign
59 Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 (1869); Slapp v. Slapp, 73 Ohio App. 444, 57 N.E.
2d 81 (1944) ; Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 131 S.V. 977 (1910). Honaker v.
Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291 S.W. 42 (1927).
60 Accord: Woods v. Waddle, 44 Ohio St. 449, 8 N.E. 297 (1886); Weck v. Weck,
58 Ohio App. 72, 15 N.E. 2d 780 (1938); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 54 Ohio App.
239, 6 N.E. 2d 1005 (1937); Hutton v. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198 P. 165 (1921). Contra:
Doeksen v. Doeksen, 214 Ia. 17, 241 N.W. 487 (1926); McFarlane v. McFarlane, 42
Ore. 477, 73 P. 203, 75 P. 139 (1903); Darby v. Darby, 152 Tenn. 287, 277 S.W.
894 (1926).
61 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, (1895). The reason for this distinction is that
foreign nations are not "other State (s)" within the meaning of the full faith and
credit clause.
62 Redeker v. Redeker, - Cal. - , 221 P. 2d 1 (1951); Pawley v. Pawley,
- Fla. -, 46 So. 2d 464, petition denied, 47 So. 2d 546, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
866 (1950); Caulbom v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 25 SE. 2d 576 (1943); Kenner v. Kenner,
139 Tenn. 211, 201 S.W. 779 (1918).
63 Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 811, 94 S.W. 2d 1043 (1936); Tonti v. Chad-
wick, 1 N.J. 531, 64 A. 2d 436 (1949); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.
2d 60 (1948); Machransky v. Machransky, 31 Ohio App. 482, 166 N.E. 423 (1927).
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actien is contested or is ex parte.64
A specific example of the refusal to recognize foreign divorces is
the Mexican "mail order" divorce which can be obtained by both
parties executing powers of attorney to Mexican counsel thus obviating
the necessity of appearance or residence. Uniformly these "mail order"
divorces are not recognized. 65
If both parties were present in the divorce action, which is
recognizable under the principles of comity, an action will lie in an
American court to enforce alimony payments ordered in the foreign
action.66
Foreign rabinnical divorces are given or denied recognition on
the principles of comity in the same manner as other divorces obtained
outside the United States and its possessions.6 7
A somewhat related problem is recognition of divorces obtained
in conformity with tribal customs of American Indians. These divorces
are recognized if at the time of the divorce the parties lived on the
reservation. 68 However, if the parties leave the reservation they must
satisfy the law of their new home.69 Some cases hold that it makes no
difference whether the husband is a full-blooded Indian or a half-breed
or even a white man. 70
COLLATERAL ATrACK OF FOREIGN DIVORCES BY THimD PERSONS
The very recent case of Johnson v. Muelberger7l held that a
stranger to a foreign divorce action could not collaterally attack the
divorce in another state unless such attack was allowed in the state
which granted the divorce. The Court would not permit a daughter
in a New York proceeding to collaterally attack on jurisdictional
grounds her deceased father's Florida divorce. Since the divorce could
64Pawley v. Pawley, - Fla. - 46 So. 2d 464, petition denied, 47 So. 2d
546, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950); Kapigian v. Der Minassian, 212 Mass. 412,
99 NE. 264 (1912).
65 Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 SE. 2d 818 (1944); Caldwell v.
Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E. 2d 60 (1948); De Rosay v. De Rosay, 162 Pa. super.
333, 57 A. 2d 685 (1948).
66 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 194 Misc. 73, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
67 Matter of Rubenstein, 143 Misc. 917, 257 N.Y.S. 637 (Sur. Ct. 1932); Mac-
hransky v. Machransky, 31 Ohio App. 482, 166 N.E. 423 (1927).
68 Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P. 2d 624 (1950); La Framboise v. Day, 136
Minn. 239, 161 NA.. 529 (1917); Thomas v. Healey, 152 Okla. 93, 3 P. 2d 1047
(1931).
69 La Framboise v. Day, 136 Minn. 239, 161 N.W. 529 (1917); In re Wa-gin-
up's, 57 Utah 29, 192 P. 267 (1920).
70 Cyr v. Wallser, 29 Okla. 281, 116 P. 931 (1911).
71 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
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not be collaterally attacked in Florida it was entitled to full faith and
credit in New York.
FRAUD
The statement is often made that a foreign divorce may be col-
laterally attacked on the ground of fraud.7 2 For this result to obtain,
the fraud must be of a character which goes to the jurisdiction of the
court thus rendering the decree void. However, it must be noted that
there is no Supreme Court case directly in point with regard to the
entire problem of fraud, and any analysis of the various methods of
fraud should not overlook the liberality exercised by the Supreme
Court in the recognition of foreign divorces.
Generally speaking, there are five methods of fraud practiced in
obtaining foreign divorces. They are: (1) collusion of the parties, (2)
fraudulent evidence, (3) fraudulently inducing the other spouse to
enter an appearance, (4) withholding from the court the fact of the
pendency of a similar action in another State, and (5) secreting the
whereabouts of the other spouse.
As has been already stated the tendancy of the Supreme Court in
recent years has been to favor the recognition of foreign divorces. By
way of conjecture it seems that the Supreme Court would dispose of
fraud cases as it did cases regarding the right of third persons to
collaterally attack foreign divorces, 73 i.e., an attack would be allowed
only if such were allowed in the State which granted the divorce. Al-
though the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on this issue, there
are many state decisions involving the various methods of fraud.
Where the parties collude in obtaining a divorce a subsequent
collateral attack is allowed unless an estoppel is found.7 4
The cases involving fraudulent evidence readily break down into
two categories; fraud which goes to the substantive grounds for divorce,
and fraud which goes to the jurisdictional requirements. In both con-
tested and ex parte divorces the majority of decisions do not allow a
collateral attack with respect to fraudulent evidence running to the
substantive grounds for divorce.75 Nevertheless, the courts allow
collateral attack against foreign exparte divorce where the fraud runs
72 SCHOULER DIVORCE MANUAL, §378 (1944).
73 cf. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
74 Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N.J. 380, 78 A. 2d 896 (1951).
75 Baldwin v. Baldwin, 28 Cal. 2d 406, 170 P. 2d 670 (1946); Patterson v. Pat-
terson, - Cal. App. -, 187 P. 2d 113 (1948); Nicholson v. Nicholson, 113 Ind.
131, 15 N.E. 223 (1888); Hughes v. Hughes, 211 Ky. 799, 278 S.V. 121 (1925); Keena
v. Keena, 222 Mo. App. 825, 10 S.W. 2d 344 (1928); Watters v. Watters, 259 App.
Div. 611, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 995 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1940). Contra: Corwin v. Common-
wealth, 131 Va. 649, 108 S.E. 651 (1921).
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to the jurisdictional requirements. 76 This position is supported by
two older*Supreme Court casesT7 and apparently receives the blessing
of the all important "domicile" theory of the Williams cases.7 8 In cases
involving contested divorces, however, the argument could well be
made that the parties had opportunity to litigate the issue and, under
the reasoning of the Sheerer79 and Coe s ° cases, are estopped from any
collateral re-examination.
The few cases in point decidedly hold that the deceived spouse
may collaterally attack a divorce in which her spouse fraudulently
induced her to make an appearances' or fraudulently induced her
not to contest the action.8 2 Moreover, this appears to be analagous
to the situation where a person inveigles another into a state to have
service made upon him, and it is practically a rule of thumb that no
jurisdiction attaches under these circumstances.8 3 With this back-
ground, it is doubtful if even the very liberal Supreme Court would
require full faith and credit.
The majority of states find a fraud which goes to the jurisdiction
when the spouse who obtains a foreign ex parte divorce conceals the
pendency of a similar action by the other spouse in another State.8 4
In regard to pending actions for separate maintenance, there is little
doubt but that the Supreme Court would expand Estin v. Estin8 5 to
include pending as well as cases already determined.
The courts also generally declare that the concealment of the
other spouses whereabouts from the court which granted the divorce
is a fraud which goes to the jurisdiction.8 6 This method of fraud ap-
76 Wilkes v. Wilkes, 254 Ala. 54, 16 So. 2d 15 (1944); Azur v. Thomas, 206 Ga.
588, 57 S.E. 2d 821 (1950); Chapman v. Chapman, 224 Mass. 427, 113 N.E. 359
(1916) ; Wright v. Wright, 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W. 2d 870 (1942). In both the Wilkes
and Wright cases the court characterized as direct that which might be called a
collateral attack.
77 Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1900); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179 (1900).
78 317 U.S. 287 (1945).
79 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
80 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
81 Averbuck v. Averbuck, 270 App. Div. 160, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 392 (1st Dep't 1945).
Gagliano v. Gagliano, 56 N.Y.S. 619, affr'd, 269 App. Div. 1025, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 377
(Ist Dep't 1945).
82 Daniels v. Benedict, 50 Fed. 347 (1892).
83 Commercial Mut. Acci. Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909) ; Urschel v. Hannin,
25 Ohio App. 368, 158 N.E. 550 (1927).
84 Atkins v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54 N.E. 2d 488 (1944); Anglin v. City of
Omaha, 140 Neb. 147, 294 N.V. 353 (1941) ; Contra, Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Ore. 140,
220 P. 2d 616 (1949). In the Rodda case, a pending action was not involved; a prior
order for separate maintenance was in issue.
85 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
86 In re Nolan's Estate, 56 Ariz. 361, 108 P. 2d 388 (1940); Leichty v. Kansas
City Bridge Co., 354 Mo. 629, 190 S.V. 2d 201, cert. den., 327 U.S. 782 (1946); Todd
v. Policemen's and Firemen's Pension Fund of Newark, - NJ., - , 82 A. 2d
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pears to be the weakest and one which the Supreme Court might say
does not go to the jurisdiction of the court, thereby requiring full faith
and credit be given the divorce.
ESTOPPEL
The scope of this comment does not cover the rule of estoppel as
applicable to foreign divorces, but the problem should be recognized
-and a few examples given.
The premise of estoppel in this area is that a person will be barred
from attacking a divorce, which is not under the protection of the full
faith and credit clause, because of the existence of certain facts. It
should be noted that Estin v. Estin, supra, Sheerer v. Sheerer, supra,
and Coe v. Coe, supra, have laid down a definite rule for many
questions which previously were determined under the rule of estoppel.
Some of the facts which the courts often find giving rise to an
estoppel are: (1) where the spouse who obtained a foreign divorce
later wishes to question it;87 (2) one who aided his wife in procurring
a divorce from her former husband subsequently asserts its invalidity;Bs
(3) a spouse who remarries in reliance on a divorce obtained by her
spouse subsequently attacks the divorce;8 9 and (4) where the party
attempting the attack is guilty of laches.90
In conclusion, the true answer as to when or whether certain facts
will constitute an estoppel appears to lie within the courts' discretion
and sense of fairness under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to draw a hard and fast
conclusion applicable to the varied situations arising in relation to
the recognition of foreign divorces. Again, it should be pointed out
that the Supreme Court apparently still maintains its liberal attitude.
233 (1951). Contra, Commonwealth ex rel. Cronhardt v. Cronhardt, 135 Pa. Super.
117, 4 A. 2d 589 (1939). In both the Leichty and Todd cases, a denial of due process
was found under these facts.
87 Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E. 2d 290 (1940); McIntyre v. Mc-
Intyre, 216 N.C. 698, 191 S.E. 507 (1937); Horowitz v. Horowitz, 58 RI. 396, 192 A.
796 (1937).
88 Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 160 N.Y.S. 19 (App. Div. 3
Dep't (1917).
89 Kelsey v. Kelsey, 203 Cal. 61, 263 P. 200 (1928); Parmlee v. Hutchins, 238
Mass. 561, 131 N.E. 443 (1921).
90 Sleeper v. Sleeper, 129 N.J. Eq. 99, 18 A. 2d 1 (1941); McNeir v. McNeir, 178
Va. 285, 16 S.E. 2d 632 (1941).
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By way of final conjecture, it appears to this writer that the court will
extend this liberality to the recognition of foreign alimony decrees,
especially those subject to retroactive modification but which have
not been modified.
John B. Dwyer
